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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Petitioner,
v.

:

Case No. 2002103 8-SC

:

Ct. App. No. 20010988-CA

MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA,
Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF PETITIONER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This Court granted certiorari to review the Utah Court of Appeals' split decision
below in State v. Samora (Samora II), 2002 UT App 384, 59 P.3d 604 (attached in
Addendum A).1
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because illegal sentences are void ab initio, they may be vacated at any time under
rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and do not limit the range of resentencing

'A copy of State v. Samora (Samora I), 2001 UT App 266 (memorandum
decision), which is also relevant to this appeal, is attached as Addendum B.

on remand. Can a sentence be illegal for purposes of 22(e), but nevertheless limit the
range of resentencing on remand?
The interpretation of a rule is a question of law, reviewable for correctness. Brown
v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, f 15, 16 P.3d 540.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is relevant to this petition: 'The
court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any
time."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
On April 18,2000, defendant was charged with unlawful control over a motor
vehicle with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner of possession, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314 (1998). R. 2-3. On August 8, 2000,
Judge Robin Reese took defendant's guilty plea to attempted unlawful control over a
motor vehicle, a class A misdemeanor. R. 63:5. At the plea-taking, defendant agreed to
pay restitution to the victim, his former girlfriend. R. 63:3.
Judge Reese told defendant to make an appointment with Adult Probation and
Parole for preparation of a presentence investigation report (PSI) and notified defendant
of his September 22, 2000 sentencing hearing before Judge J. Dennis Frederick. R. 63:8.

2

This statement of the case borrows freely from Judge Russell W. Bench's
dissenting opinion. To facilitate readability, quotation marks are not used.
2

Defendant failed to appear for preparation of his PSI or for sentencing. R. 41, 64:2. At
sentencing, Judge Frederick found that defendant had voluntarily failed to appear.
R. 64:2. No sentencing information was presented at the proceeding, and Judge Frederick
imposed the maximum jail time and fine. See R. 42-43, 64.
On first appeal, the court of appeals vacated defendant's sentence. State v. Samora
(Samora I), 2001 UT App 266 (memorandum opinion) (included in the record at R. 92)
(attached in Addendum B). The court of appeals vacated, despite defendant's status as a
fugitive, holding that defendant's sentence was "a sentence imposed in an illegal manner"
under rule 22(e), subject to correction at any time. Id. at f 3 & n.l. 3
At the resentencing hearing, defendant appeared and affirmatively asserted that,
under his plea agreement, he owed restitution. R. 122:3-4. He said that he owed about
$900, maybe "a little higher," although the victim testified that $744.80 would cover her
losses. Id. at 4-6. Judge Frederick ordered defendant to pay the lesser sum in restitution,
plus the maximum jail time and fine. R. 94-95. Apparently, defendant had hoped that he
would be ordered to pay only restitution and no fine. Defendant's attorney made the
following statement to the court:
[I]t would be my request on behalf of Mr. Samora that the Court do a
couple of things. One, that the Court would waive the fine. There is some
restitution owing that was part of the negotiation in this case to the victim.
They've—Mr. Samora and the victim in this case had a fairly long-term

3

Because Samora I is a memorandum decision, its paragraphs are not numbered.
The State has numbered the paragraphs to facilitate citation.
3

relationship before this all happened and there was, as a part of the
negotiation, he's to pay some restitution with respect to that.
We'd ask the Court to—to waive or at least to reduce the fine
substantially and—and ask that the Court give him credit for time served on
this case.
R. 122:3-4. Defendant never claimed below that the imposition of restitution, in addition
to the fine, would violate due process or Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1999).
Defendant brought a second appeal, claiming that imposition of restitution violated
his statutory and constitutional rights. Br. Aplt in Case No. 20010988-CA, at 1-2. In a
split decision, the court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that defendant's new
sentence was presumptively vindictive. Samora II, 2002 UT App 384, at f 19. The final
paragraph of the court's decision makes this enigmatic statement about jurisdiction and
preservation: "We conclude that we have jurisdiction in this case despite Defendant's
failure to preserve the issues before the trial court because the trial court illegally imposed
sentence in the first sentencing. Alternatively, there was plain error in imposing
sentence."4 Id. atf 23.

4

The State also argued below that the new sentence was proper under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-405(2)(a) (1999), which allows for an increased sentence when it is "based
on facts which were not known to the court at the time of the original sentence." The
court of appeals rejected this argument, holding that the sentencing court should have
reviewed the record, including defendant's plea statement in which he agreed to pay
restitution. Samora II, 2002 UT App 384, atffl|20, 21.
4

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
According to the probable cause statement, defendant was drinking at his
girlfriend's home, became angry, and drove away in her car without her permission. R. 3.
Defendant's relative telephoned the following day and gave the girlfriend the vehicle's
location. Id. She then retrieved the vehicle. Id.
According to testimony given at resentencing, defendant destroyed a fence while
driving the vehicle. R. 122:6. Collection proceedings for the value of the fence had been
initiated against defendant's girlfriend, affecting her credit rating. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court of appeals erred when it created a new class of sentences which are
illegal for one purpose (access to review), but not for another (effect on resentencing).
The new class of sentences, labeled "sentences imposed in an illegal manner," is contrary
to rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which treats "illegal sentences" and
"sentences imposed in an illegal manner" equally. The new class is inconsistent with this
Court's precedent and is contrary to sound policy. In cases involving alleged procedural
error at sentencing, it will effectively eviscerate preservation rules and may even abrogate
the requirement for a timely notice of appeal.

5

ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS CREATED A NEW CLASS OF RULE
22(e) SENTENCES INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRECEDENT
ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT AND CONTRARY TO SOUND
POLICY
Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that a "court may correct
an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." This Court
has invoked this rule only to permit correction of manifestly illegal sentences.
In its decision below, the court of appeals created a new class of rule 22(e)
sentences—sentences which are illegal for one purpose, but not for another. The court of
appeals' decision labels defendant's original sentence as "a sentence imposed in an illegal
manner" and treats it as an illegal sentence for one purpose (access to review), but not for
another (effect on resentencing). This decision is contrary to rule 22(e), which treats "an
illegal sentence" and "a sentence impose in an illegal manner" equally. The decision is
also incompatible with this Court's decisions which have never treated a sentence as
illegal for one purpose but not for another, and it is inconsistent with the rationale
expressed by this Court in State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 (Utah 1991). Finally, it is
contrary to the dictates of sound policy.
A.

The court of appeals has created a hybrid category of sentencing error with
characteristics of both ordinary sentencing error and rule 22(e) sentencing
error.
This Court's precedent delineates two kinds of sentencing error, each with its own

procedures and rules of review. Almost always, this Court addresses "ordinary

sentencing error," and the ordinary rules of appellate review apply. Occasionally, this
Court addresses rule 22(e) "illegal sentences." Because illegal sentences are void, they
are reviewed under a different set of rules. This Court has not addressed the difference, if
any, between "an illegal sentence" and "a sentence imposed in an equal manner," but has
treated them equally.
1.

Ordinary sentencing error.
Ordinary sentencing error occurs when a trial court errs during sentencing or

abuses its discretion by imposing an unreasonable sentence. For instance, a court may
impose consecutive sentences without considering statutorily-mandated factors. See State
v. Helms, 2002 UT 12,ffl|8-9,40 P.3d 626. A court may impose restitution for offenses
for which a defendant was not convicted and did not admit responsibility. See State v.
Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 937-938 (Utah 1998). In a rare case, a court may impose a sentence
"so inherently unfair" that "no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial
court." State v. Gerrard, 548 P.2d 885, 887-888 (Utah 1978). These are all examples of
ordinary sentencing error.
Where ordinary sentencing error occurs, all parties must follow the rules governing
appellate review.
•

The defendant must file a timely notice of appeal.

•

The defendant must preserve the issue, usually by making an objection in the trial
court. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n. (Utah 1995). If he does not,

7

he must demonstrate "plain error" or "exceptional circumstances" to justify review
of his claim. See id.
The State may not appeal defendant-favorable error. For instance, while a
defendant may claim that the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive
sentences, the State may not claim that the court erred when it imposed concurrent,
rather than consecutive sentences. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l (1999). While
a defendant may claim that a sentence imposed was so harsh that no reasonable
judge would have imposed it, the State cannot claim that the sentence was so
lenient that no reasonable judge would have imposed it. See id.
Under most circumstances, a trial court may not impose a harsher sentence when
an original sentence is vacated upon a successful appeal. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-405 (1999); State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,ffif73-74, 979 P.2d 799; State v.
Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179, 180-181 (Utah 1981). The purpose of this rule is "to
assure that there is no chilling or deterring of the criminal defendant's exercise of
his basic constitutional right to appeal." Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 at ^ 73 (quoting
Sorensen, 639 P.2d at 181). The defendant is the only party who has the
prerogative to seek review of ordinary sentencing error. See Utah Code Ann. § 7718a-1. The possibility that a decision to appeal might lead to a harsher sentence
could deter the defendant's exercise of his constitutional right to appeal.

8

2.

Rule 22(e) sentencing error.
This Court has addressed rule 22(e) sentences in a number of cases, including State

v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 551 (Utah 1996), State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d at 86-88, and
State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, 1389-1390 (Utah 1988). In all of these cases, the trial
court imposed a sentence that did not conform to the governing statute. See Babbel, 813
P.2d at 86 (statute provided for minimum mandatory term, but trial court imposed
indeterminate term); Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 551 (statute did not authorize the
consecutive, determinate two-year enhancement that the trial court imposed); Lorrah, 761
P.2d at 1390 (trial court imposed sentence "not to exceed ten years," but statute mandated
minimum mandatory sentence of five, ten, or fifteen years).5
Where an illegal sentence has been imposed, all parties must follow the rules and
procedures governing the correction of an illegal sentence. These rules, which are laid
out in rule 22(e) and this Court's precedent, differ markedly from the rules governing the
appeal of ordinary sentencing error.
•

A party may move to correct an illegal sentence at any time whether or not the
issue has been preserved, whether or not the party can demonstrate plain error or
exceptional circumstances, and whether or not a timely notice of appeal has been
filed. "[A]n illegal sentence is void." Babbel, 813 P.2d at 88. Because it is void it
5

This Court has also rejected claims that sentences were illegal in a number of
cases. See State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, f 8, 994 P.2d 1243; State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d
856, 858-860 (Utah 1995); State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1033 (Utah 1994); State v.
Wareham, 801 P.2d 918, 919-920 & n.2 (Utah 1990).
9

can be corrected "at any time." See id.; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). A trial
court "ha[s] the power to correct an illegal sentence 'at any time whether before or
after an appeal, and even if there is no appeal.'" State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860
(Utah 1990) (quoting Babbel, 813 P.2d at 88). An appellate court can also vacate
an illegal sentence discovered during an appeal. "Because an illegal sentence is
void," a challenge to a sentence's legality is "raisable at any time." Id.
Because an illegal sentence is void, it is "of no legal effect." Babbel, 813 P.2d at
88. It "creates norightsand neither impair[s] nor affect[s] any right." Id.
The State, as well as the defendant, may seek correction of an illegal sentence. Id.
at 86. Apparently, the trial court may, on its own initiative, correct an illegal
sentence. See Lorrah,16\ P.2dat 1389-1390.
A vacated illegal sentence does not limit the court's sentencing discretion at
resentencing. When a new sentence is imposed, it is, in effect, an original
sentence. The void and vacated sentence does not circumscribe or otherwise affect
the trial court's prerogatives at resentencing. The trial court may therefore impose
a legal sentence "regardless of whether the correction involves an increase" in
severity. See Babbel, 813 P.2d at 88 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Further, the possibility of a harsher sentence following vacation of an
illegal sentence does not chill a defendant's constitutional right to appeal. While
only the defendant can decide whether to seek review of ordinary sentencing error,
either may party seek correction of an illegal sentence. Because a defendant
10

cannot prevent the State from seeking correction of an illegal sentence, his
decision to appeal does not open the only conduit to review of an illegal sentence.
His sentence can be corrected before or after his appeal and even if he does not
appeal. Because the possibility of a harsher sentence exists independent of the
defendant's decision to seek or forego an appeal, the possibility of a harsher
sentence does not deter the defendant's exercise of his constitutional right to
appeal.
This Court has not definitively addressed the difference, if any, between "an illegal
sentence" and "a sentence imposed in an illegal manner." This Court had held, however,
that the purpose of rule 22(e) is to allow correction of "manifestly illegal sentences."6
State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, f 5, 48 P.3d 228. Further, this Court has held that "rule
22(e) claims are not restricted by time limits for bringing a notice of appeal." Id. "Nor
are they waived by failure to raise them at the first opportunity before the district court."
Id. "For this reason, rule 22(e) claims must be narrowly circumscribed to prevent abuse."
Id.

6

"Manifestly" means plainly, obviously, or evidently. A sentence is imposed in a
manifestly illegal manner when the illegality can be "readily and instantly perceived."
See Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged). Thus, the illegality
should be evident without a search of the record and a determination of what rights may
or may not have been waived.
11

Thus, rule 22(e) "allow[s] correction of manifestly illegal sentences." Telford,
2002 UT 51 at ^ 5. Likewise, rule 22(e) allows correction of sentences imposed in a
manifestly illegal manner.
Moreover, when a sentence is imposed in a manifestly illegal manner (perhaps
without jurisdiction), the resulting sentence, like an illegal sentence that does not conform
to the offense, must be treated as void. See Telford, 2002 UT 51 at f 5 n.l ("rule 22(e)
may be employed to correct a sentence under circumstances where the sentencing court
had no jurisdiction, or to correct a sentence beyond the authorized statutory range"). Like
an illegal sentence, a sentence imposed in an illegal manner cannot create legalrightsor
limit the range of sentencing at remand.7

7

The State could find no casefromthis Court specifically defining what rule 22(e)
means by a sentence "imposed in an illegal manner." The State therefore does not
attempt to propose an exhaustive list of circumstances in which a sentence may be
imposed "in an illegal manner." It is clear, however, that the circumstances in which a
sentence could be so characterized are few. It could be argued, for example, that a
sentence that conforms to the crime, but is imposed by a court without jurisdiction, is a
sentence imposed in a manifestly illegal manner. See Telford, 2002 UT 51 atf 5 n.l.
Further, while the terminology "imposed in an illegal manner" is used in the rules
and statutes of other jurisdictions, precedent from those jurisdictions should be viewed
with caution. In most jurisdictions, sentences imposed in an illegal manner are
reviewable only within a limited period after the sentence is imposed. See, e.g., Ark.
Code Ann. § 6-90-111 (West 2001) (ninety days); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-31-1 (West
2002) (one year). Where illegally imposed sentences are correctable at any time, as they
are in Utah, categorizing a sentence as illegally imposed implicates different policy
considerations than it does in jurisdictions that limit the review period.
12

3.

The court of appeals' hybrid sentencing error.
The court of appeals' decision below effectively splits rule 22(e) sentences into

two groups: (I) illegal sentences—meaning they can be corrected at any time, they are
void, and they do not limit the severity of a new sentence imposed after they have been
vacated, and (2) "sentences imposed in an illegal manner"—meaning they too can be
corrected at any time, but they apparently are not void because they do limit the severity
of new sentences imposed after they have been vacated. Thus, while an illegal sentence
has no legal effect and creates no rights, " a sentence imposed in an illegal manner" does
have a legal effect and does create new rights.
As a result, the sentence imposed in an illegal manner, as defined by the court of
appeals, is a new creature. It is, in fact, a hybrid, having some characteristics of ordinary
sentencing error and some characteristics of rule 22(e) sentencing error.
This hybrid is the best of all possible worlds for a defendant. It allows the
defendant to challenge sentencing error at any time—apparently even years after it
occurs. A defendant can challenge the error without preserving it below or demonstrating
plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. He can apparently challenge the error
even though he does not file a notice of appeal.
But, once the sentence is challenged, the ordinary strictures of appellate review
apply. The sentence is not, like an illegal sentence, void. Rather, it creates legal rights
that limit the range of sentencing on remand. On remand, the trial court can impose a
sentence no more severe than the original sentence.
13

Although the court of appeals has taken a phrase from rule 22(e) to give its hybrid
a name, the hybrid is without the theoretical moorings that explain and govern rule 22(e)
sentences. The court of appeals has, in fact, created a class of sentences that eviscerates
the preservation rules and likely abrogates the ordinary requirements for filing a timely
notice of appeal. At least with respect to claimed errors that occur during sentencing, the
decision in this case turns the ordinary appellate process on its head. This Court should
re-clarify the limited scope of rule 22(e) review and the consequences that follow
invocation of the rule.
B.

The court of appeals9 error here is the culmination of a line of cases unduly
expanding the scope of rule 22(e).

L

Wanosik, Samora I, and Samora II.
The court of appeals cited two of its own cases to support its decision here. A

review of those cases may help explain how and why the court erred. In thefirstcase,
State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, 31 P.3d 615, the court of appeals addressed a
defendant's claim that the trial court failed to comply with rule 22(a), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, when it did not solicit sentencing inputfromdefense counsel and the
prosecutor.8 Id. at f 27. Responding to the State's argument that Wanosik had to show
plain error with regard to this claim because he had not preserved it below, the court of
8

This Court granted the State's petition for certiorari in Wanosik. The case has
now been briefed, argued, and submitted. It addresses sentencing-in-absentia issues; it
touches secondarily on rule 22(e) issues. This Court may or may not reach the rule 22(e)
issues briefed in Wanosik, and its decision may or may not dispose of the rule 22(e) issue
raised here.
14

appeals stated, "We observe 'that rule 22(e) [of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure]
permits the court of appeals to consider the legality of a sentence even if the issue is
raised for the first time on appeal.'" Id. at f 28 n.l 1 (quoting State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d
856, 860 (Utah 1995)). The court of appeals then concluded that the trial court had not
complied with rule 22(a). Id. at f 32. Thus, the court of appeals held, a sentence imposed
in a proceeding where defense counsel and the prosecutor were not invited to speak, was
an illegal sentence.
In State v. Samora (Samora I), 2001 UT App 266 (memorandum decision)
(attached as Addendum B), which followed, the issue arose again. In that case,
defendant was sentenced in absentia and remained a fugitive when defense counsel
brought the appeal. Id. The State argued that defendant's appeal should be dismissed,
subject to reinstatement if he returned to the jurisdiction. Id. The court of appeals
rejected this argument, holding that Wanosik was dispositive and required a remand for
resentencing. Id. The court of appeals observed, "Even if we were to dismiss the appeal,
Samora could challenge the sentence in the trial court under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure." Id. at n.l (citing Wanosik, 241 UT App 241 at f 28 n.l 1). The
court quoted the language of rule 22(e): "The Court may correct... a sentence imposed
in an illegal manner, at any time." Id. The court also cited Wanosik, referencing its
holding that "issues regarding illegality of the sentence under Rule 22(a) can be
considered for the first time on appeal under Rule 22(e)." Id. Apparently, the court did

15

not make any distinction between "illegal sentences" and "sentences imposed in an illegal
manner."
The case was remanded, and defendant was resentenced. At resentencing, the trial
judge imposed a restitution order that had not been imposed at the earlier sentencing.
Compare R. 94-95 with R. 42-43, 64. Defendant again appealed, arguing that the new
sentence was presumptively vindictive and contrary to statutory and case law proscribing
harsher sentences following successful appeals. State v. Samora (Samora II), 2002 UT
App 384, 59 P.3d 604. The court of appeals agreed and reversed. Id. at f 23. In its
decision, the court of appeals rejected the State's argument that the presumption of
vindictiveness is not applicable when illegal sentences are corrected. Id. atffl|15-16. The
court reasoned, "The [original] sentence itself was not illegal, but the manner in which it
was imposed was contrary to law."9 Id. at % 16. In its conclusion, the court of appeals
again stated that "the trial court illegally imposed sentence in the first sentencing." Id. at
f 23. Here, for the first time in this line of cases, the court separated the two phrases in
rule 22(e), and, for the first time, treated them as different classes of sentences.

9

The full context is this: "Defendant's resentencing did not result from an original
sentence contrary to statutory minimum mandatory requirements. Rather, Defendant's
original sentence was vacated because he was sentenced in absentia. The sentence itself
was not illegal, but the manner in which it was imposed was contrary to law." Samora II,
2002 UT App 384 at f 16. The statement demonstrates the court of appeals' expansive
view of rule 22(e). In Wanosik, the court of appeals found rule 22(e) error in the failure
to solicit sentencing input. Here, the court has widened its view. Apparently, as
articulated by the court of appeals in the instant case, rule 22(e) error—not ordinary
appellate error—occurs even when a defendant is sentenced in absentia.
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2.

Other court of appeals9 decisions.
The holdings in the Samora line of cases are only some in a growing number

suggesting the court of appeals' willingness to extend the reach of rule 22(e). In
extending the sweep of rule 22(e), however, the court of appeals has not examined the
ramifications of its broad reading of the rule. The following decisions are illustrative:
•

In State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah App. 1991), the court of appeals implicitly
held that a trial court's failure to order that a defendant be mentally examined prior
to sentencing could constitute rule 22(e) error.
In State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1994), the court held that the
defendant's claim that he had been improperly denied the return of fees did not
constitute a rule 22(e) error. Unfortunately, in defining an "illegal sentence," the
court cited habeas corpus cases addressing Shondel, equal protection, and due
process challenges.

•

In State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283 (Utah App. 1998), the court erroneously held
that rule 22(e) permitted review of the defendant's merger claim. See State v.
Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, f 8, 994 P.2d 1243 (addressing the court of appeals'
error).

•

In State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, 975 P.2d 476, the court properly reviewed
the defendant's preserved claim that his sentencing violated double jeopardy. The
court suggested in dicta, however, that absent preservation the issue would be
reviewable pursuant to rule 22(e). Id. at % 6 n. 1.

•

In State v. Burr, 2000 UT App 288 (memorandum opinion) (attached in
Addendum C), the court addressed the defendant's rule 22 claim that his
"sentence was imposed in an illegal manner because he was not personally
provided with a copy of the presentence report." Id. at f 2. While the court
rejected the claim on the merits, it did not question the propriety of the rule 22(e)
route to review.

In State v. Headley, 2002 UT App 58 (memorandum opinion) (attached in Addendum
D), the court of appeals attempted to distinguish between illegal sentences and sentences
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imposed in an illegal manner. In so doing, the court cited foreign authority suggesting
that sentences imposed in an illegal manner are "those that are within statutory and
jurisdictional limits, but violate a defendant's rights." Id. at f 2 & n.2. Five of the six
cases cited by the Headley court as authority for an expansive reading of "sentences
imposed in an illegal manner" comefromjurisdictions where that expansive reading is
tempered by rules that limit the period for review of sentences imposed in an illegal
manner. See United States .v Katzin, 824 F.2d. 234, 237 (3rd Cir. 1987) (120 days);
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 239 F.3d 293, 299 n.3 (3rd Cir. [V.I.] 2001)
(120 days); State v. Sieler, 554 N.W.2d 477,479 (S.D. 1996) (120 days); State v.
Anderson, 661 P.2d 716, 720 (Haw. App. 1983) (90 days); State v. Brooks, 589 A.2d 444,
446 (Me. 1991) (one year). Categorizing a sentence as "imposed in an illegal manner" in
those jurisdictions has different consequences and policy implications than it does in a
jurisdiction like Utah with no time limit.10
C.

Assuming the error here must be treated as rule 22(e) error, it must be
treated as rule 22(e) error for all purposes, including remand.
The court of appeals probably erred when, in Samora I, it defined defendant's

original sentence as a sentence imposed in an illegal manner. That decision may now be

{0

Headley also cited this Court's 1972 decision in Kuehnert v. Turner, 499 P.2d
839 (Utah 1972), a habeas case, where this Court remanded a case to the district court for
resentencing upon a showing that the defendant was sentenced without counsel present.
While this Court referred to the Kuehnert's sentence as "invalid," it never referred to rule
22(e) nor to its implications. Id. at 841. Rather, it found that the defendant had
demonstrated in his habeas proceeding that he had been deprived of a constitutional right
and that the deprivation was harmful. Id. at 839-840.
18

"law of the case" and not remediable.11 See Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr.$
Inc., 2003 UT 23, U 25, _ P.3d _ (citing Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034,
1037 (Utah 1995)) ("Under the law of the case doctrine, 'a decision made on an issue
during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the same litigation."^).
But the court of appeals, circumscribed by its own error, created even greater error in this
case by defining a new class of sentences that, while not "manifestly illegally" and while
not "imposed in a manifestly illegal manner," are subject to correction at any time, but are
not void, and therefore create legal rights that limit the range of sentencing on remand.12
This Court should take this opportunity to clarify what constitutes a rule 22(e)
sentence and to explain that rule 22(e)'s reference to "a sentence imposed in an illegal
manner" does not create a new class of sentencing error eviscerating the ordinary rules of
appellate review.
With respect to this defendant, where the court of appeals determined that the
original sentence constituted rule 22(e) error and where that determination is now "law of
1l

The State did not seek certiorari review of Samora L The court of appeals issued
its memorandum decision in the case on September 7, 2001. While the State disagreed
with the holding and reasoning in the case, the State did not believe that the unpublished
decision created binding precedent. On March 8, 2002, seven months later, this Court
issued its decision in Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, 44 P.3d 734. In that
decision, this Court took "the opportunity to correct the misimpression that the Judicial
Council ha[d] authority to adopt rules governing the use of memorandum decisions in the
appellate process" and to clarify that "decisions of the court of appeals expressed in a
memorandum decision, or in an opinion, are equally binding upon the lower courts of this
state" and "may be presented as precedential authority to a lower court or as persuasive
authority to this court." Id. at f 16.
n

See Judge Bench's dissenting opinion, Samora II, 2002 UT App 384 atffl[25-33.
19

the case," this Court should hold that the trial court did not err when it imposed a
corrected sentence within the statutory limits, even though that sentence may have been
more severe than defendant's original sentence.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the decision below and provide clarification on the reach
of rule 22(e) and the rules governing the review of rule 22(e) sentences, including
"sentence[s] imposed in an illegal manner."
RESPECTFULLY submitted on ^ _ June 2003.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
llA^Utx/ 6 ^
JEANNE B. INOUYE
assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A

Paue 1

Court of Appeals of Utah
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v
Manuel Ernesto SAMORA, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 20010988-CA.
Nov 15,2002

Defendant pled guilty to attempted joyriding with
intent to temporarily deprive owner After his
original sentence was vacated on appeal, the Third
District Court, Salt Lake Department, J Dennis
Frederick, J , resentenced defendant Defendant
appealed The Court of Appeals, Pamela T
Greenwood, J , held that (1) order imposmg
restitution at resentencing was presumptively
vindictive, (2) defendant's reference to restitution at
resentencing hearing was insufficient to rebut
presumption of vmdictiveness, and (3) trial court was
precluded from imposing harsher sentence on remand
without specifying reasons for deviating from
prohibition against imposmg harsher sentences on
remand following appeal
Sentence vacated, remanded
Russell W Bench, J , filed dissenting opinion.

West Headnotes

original sentence for attempted joyriding with intent
to temporarily deprive owner, imposed in absentia,
was vacated on appeal, was presumptively vindictive
under resentencing statute and due process insofar as
allowing imposition of harsher sentence on retrial
after original sentence imposed in absentia was
vacated would have had chilling effect on right to
appeal I S C \ Const Amend 14. L C \ 1 9 ^ "63-405
[31 Sentencing and Punishment ^ ^ 1 1 5 ( 4 )
350Hkl 15(4) Most Cited Cases
Defendant's request at resentencing hearing for
attempted joyriding with intent to temporarily
depnve owner, that trial court significantly reduce
fine so that he could instead pay restitution, was
insufficient, by itself, to rebut presumption of
vmdictiveness arising from imposition of harsher
sentence on remand after original sentence, illegally
imposed in absentia, was vacated UC A 1953, 76-3405
141 Sentencing and Punishment € ^ 1 1 5 ( 4 )
350Hkl 15(4) Most Cited Cases
Defendant's reference to payment of restitution did
not constitute facts that were unknown at time of
original sentencing hearing, so as to warrant
imposition of harsher sentence on remand by
ordering restitution at resentencing after original
sentence, which did not require restitution, was
vacated on appeal, issue of restitution had been raised
at plea hearing prior to onginal sentencing
UC A 1953, 76-3-405(2)(a)

111 Constitutional Law
92k270( 1) Most Cited Cases

[51 Sentencing and Punishment €~^115(4)
3SQHU 15(4) Most Cited Cases

[11 Sentencing and Punishment C - ^ 6
150Hk6 Most Cited Cases

[21 Constitutional Law €=^270(3)
92k270(3) Most Cited Cases

Trial court was precluded from imposing order of
restitution on remand after ongmal sentence for
attempted joyriding with intent to temporarily
deprive owner, which did not require restitution, was
vacated, without specifying basis for deviating from
statute prohibiting imposition of harsher sentences on
retrial after original sentence has been vacated on
appeal U C A 1953 76-3-405
*604 Joan C Watt and John K West, Salt Lake
Legal Defender Association, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant

[21 Sentencing and Punishment
"oQHkl 15(4) Most Cited Cases

Mark L Shurtleif, Attorney General, and Jeanne B
Inouye, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee

The burden is on the State to establish that a
defendant's harsher sentence on remand does not
violate the requirements of due process and the
statute governing sentencing on remand U S C A
Const Amend 14, U C A 1953, 76-3-405

Imposition of restitution on remand after defendant's
Copr £> West 2003 No Claim to Orig U S Govt Works
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*605 OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge
**1 K 1 Manuel Ernesto Samora (Defendant)
appeals from a sentence for attempted joyriding with
intent to temporarily deprive owner, a class A
misdemeanor, in \ lolation of Utah Code Ann § 41la-1314 (1998) and Ltah Code \nn. $ 76-4-101
(1999). Defendant argues that the trial judge erred in
imposing a harsher sentence following reversal of his
original sentence on appeal. We vacate Defendant's
sentence and remand.

BACKGROUND
f 2 On August 8, 2000, Defendant pleaded guilty to
attempted unlawful control of a motor vehicle with
intent to temporarily deprive owner. As part of his
plea agreement with the State, Defendant agreed to
pay restitution to the victim. The trial court accepted
Defendant's guilty plea and agreed to release him on
his own recognizance pending sentencing. The trial
court set sentencing for September 22, 2000, in front
of a different trial judge. When Defendant failed to
appear for his September 22 sentencing, the trial
court sentenced him in absentia to the statutory
maximum one-year sentence, imposed a fine of
$2500, a surcharge, and attorney fees.
The trial
court did not impose restitution.

sentenced him
During resentencing, defense
counsel requested that the trial court v\aive or
substantially reduce Defendant's fine so Defendant
could pay the restitution that he originally agreed to
as part of the plea negotiation Defense counsel also
requested that Defendant be granted credit for the six
months he had served on his sentence awaiting the
original appellate disposition.
U 5 After taking testimony regarding the restitution
amount owing, the trial court resentenced Defendant
to the maximum one-year jail term, denying
Defendant good-time credit for the six months he had
served.
The court again imposed the maximum
$2500 fine, a surcharge, and attorney fees
In
addition, the court ordered that Defendant pay
$744.80 in restitution.
% 6 Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider
Sentence asking the trial court to reconsider its denial
of credit for time served. The trial court granted
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and gave him
credit for the time he had served.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
% 7 Defendant claims the trial court erred by
imposing restitution at resentencing when restitution
was not imposed as part of Defendant's original
sentence.
Because sentencing errors involve
questions of law, we review for correctness. See
State v Kenison. 2000 UT App 322. <[ 7. 14 P 3d
129.
ANALYSIS

t 3 Defendant appealed his sentence in absentia,
claiming it violated due process and Rule 22(a) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. On September 7,
2001, this court m a per curiam opinion vacated
Defendant's sentence and remanded his case for
resentencing in accordance with State v Wanosik.
2001 VI App 241. 31 P3d 615. cert granted, 42
P 3d 951 (Utah 2002) fFNll

FN1 Wanosik held that due process and
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a)
require a trial court to conduct adequate
inquiry into the actual voluntariness of
Defendant's absence before proceeding to
sentence in absentia 2001 UT App 241. 1|
37-38,31 P 3d 615

K 4 On November 16, 2001, Defendant appeared for
resentencing before the judge who previously

[ij % 8 Defendant argues that the trial court erred
when it imposed restitution at resentencing without
waiving or substantially reducing the fine Defendant
owed. He contends that due process and Utah Code
Ann § 76-3- 405 (1999), preclude the imposition of
a harsher sentence after a case is reversed on appeal.
The State argues that Defendant invited any
sentencing error when he declared his obligation to
pay restitution. Alternatively, the State asserts that
the trial court may increase the penalties upon
resentencing when the original sentence was illegal
or is based on facts not known to the court at the time
of the ongmal sentencing. [FN2]

FN2 The burden is on the State to establish
that Defendant's harsher sentence did not
violate the requirements of due process and
section 76- 3-405
See \orth Ciuohna \
Peaicc. 395 U S 711, 726, 89 S Ct 2072,
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208K 23 L EJ 2d 656 (1969)

*606 **2 H 9 In Xotth Catolina v Peace. 395 U S
711. 725 S9 S O 2072. 2080. 23 L Ed 2d 656
(1969), the Supreme Court held that when
resentencing a defendant, due process prevents the
sentencing judge from increasing the sentence when
that increase is motivated by vmdictiveness To free
defendants from the apprehension of such a
retaliatory motivation, the Supreme Court held that
"whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence
upon a defendant," the reasons must affirmatively
appear on the record and "be based upon objective
information concerning identifiable conduct on the
part of the defendant occurring after the tune of the
original sentencing proceeding " Id at 766. 89 S Ct
at 2081
But see Texas v McCullottzh. 475 U S
134. 140-42. 106 S Ct 976. 980-81 (1986) (stating
that language "[restricting justifications for a
sentence increase to only 'events that occurred
subsequent to the onginal proceeding' " was not
"intended to describe exhaustively all of the possible
circumstances in which a sentence increase could be
justified.").
U 10 The Utah Code also addresses limitations on
resentencing, as follows:
(1) Where a conviction or sentence has been set
aside on direct review or on collateral attack, the
court shall not impose a new sentence for the same
offense or for a different offense based on the same
conduct which is more severe than the prior
sentence less the portion of the prior sentence
previously satisfied.
(2) This section does not apply when:
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts which
were not known to the court at the time of the
original sentence, and the court affirmatively
places on the record the facts which provide the
basis for the increased sentence;....
Ltah Code Ann » 76-3-405.
H 11 In State v Sorensen. 639 P 2d 179. 180 (Utah
1981). the supreme court discussed the requirements
of due process and section 76-3-405 in relation to
resentencing. The supreme court held that section
76-3-405
prevents the Utah constitutional right to appeal
(Article VIII, § 9) from being impaired "by
imposing on a defendant who demonstrates the
error of his conviction the risk that he may be
penalized with a harsher sentence for having done

In the context of the due process requirement of
Noith Carol ma \> Peaicr. [395 1 £ "1 1 _89 S (J_
2072]. which seeks to assure that there is no
chilling or deterring of the criminal defendant's
exercise of his basic constitutional right to appeal,
and in light of the Utah constitutional constraint
against impairing the right to appeal, as articulated
m Chess v Smith [617 P 2d 3411 we think the
meaning of our statutory prohibition against a
"more severe" second sentence is clear
The
second sentence cannot exceed the first in
appearance or effect, in the number of its elements,
U C A . 1953, § 76-3-201. or in their magnitude
Sorensen. 639 P 2d at 181 (alterations in original).
**3 H 12 Our supreme court has also observed that
section 76-3-405 is "more stringent than the due
process protection [and] 'allows for no exceptions' "
State v Bakalov. 1999 UT 45. «f 73. 979 P 2d 799
(quoting Sorensen. 639 P2d at 180) Although the
State agrees that as a general rule a sentence imposed
after a successful appeal cannot be more severe than
the prior sentence, it argues that Defendant's case is
different because he invited any error by volunteering
that he owed restitution.
% 13 Defendant acknowledges he did not argue at
resentencing that the trial court was precluded from
imposing a harsher sentence on resentencing
However, Defendant asserts plain error on appeal.
The State counters, and our dissenting colleague
agrees, that Defendant invited error by initiating the
discussion of restitution and acknowledging that it
was owed. Accordingly, the State asserts that a plain
error analysis is not available. See State v Perdue.
813 P.2d 1201. 1206 (Utah CtAppl991) (stating
invited*607 error defeats claim of plain error) We
have two initial responses.
First, as noted in
Wanosik. rule 22(e) permits this court to consider
whether a defendant was illegally sentenced " 'even if
the issue is raised for thefirsttime on appeal' " State
v Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241. f 28 n 11. 31 P 3d
615. cert granted, 42 P 3d 9^ 1 (Utah 2002) (quoting
State v Brooks. 908 P 2d 856. 860 (Utah 1995))
Second, the colloquy between the trial court and
Defendant's counsel lacked sufficient clarity to
construe it as an invitation or stipulation for the trial
court to violate section 76-3-405 [FN3]

FN3. We discuss the colloquy in more detail
later in this opinion.

so.

!£ (quoting Chess v Smith. 617 P 2d 341. 343
(Utah 1980))

f
14 We acknowledge that Defendant did not
provide a plam error analysis in his brief, alluding to
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it only in the standard of review section, perhaps
relying on the proposition stated in IVanosik and
Bwok. that the issue did not need to be preserved in
the trial court. As noted in the dissenting opinion,
plain error will be found only if the appellant
establishes that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii)
the error is harmful...." Suite v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1208 (Utah 1993).
The third factor is clearly
established because Defendant received a more harsh
sentence on resentencing. We next examine the first
factor, whether error occurred, because that analysis
is necessary to a plain error evaluation and also
necessary if we have jurisdiction under Wanosik and
Brook.
We note that this issue is addressed in
Defendant's brief.
[2] K 15 We begin our analysis by determining
whether the presumption of vindictiveness as
described in Pearce is applicable. See Pearce. 395
U.S. at 725. 89 S.Ct. at 2080: State v. Babbel. 813
P.2d 86, 87 (Utah 1991). The State argues that the
principles underlying Pearce are not applicable in
this case because Defendant's original sentence was
illegal, and under Babbel. id. at 88. an illegal
sentence is void and not subject to the sentence
protections articulated in Pearce. Sorensen. Chess.
and section 76-3-405. However, we find the State's
reliance on Babbel to be misplaced.
**4 f 16 In Babbel, the defendant was sentenced to
a term less than the applicable statute's minimum
mandatory requirements. 813 P.2d86. The supreme
court concluded that the principles underlying
Pearce, Sorensen, Chess, and section 76-3-405 did
not apply because a defendant is unlikely to appeal a
sentence that is unlawfully lenient, so there is a
"minimal chilling effect on the right to appeal." Id. at
88. Unlike Babbel. Defendant's resentencing did not
result from an original sentence contrary to statutory
minimum mandatory requirements.
Rather,
Defendant's original sentence was vacated because he
was sentenced in absentia. The sentence itself was
not illegal, but the manner in which it was imposed
was contrary to law. Furthermore, allowing a harsher
sentence when the original sentence was imposed in
an illegal manner would have a "chilling effect on the
right to appeal," id^ and impair the Utah
Constitution's guaranty of the right to appeal. See
Sorensen, 639 P.2d at 181.
Therefore, because
Babbel is not applicable, we conclude that the due
process discussion in Pearce. Sorensen. and Chess
require us to apply a presumption of vindictiveness.
Accordingly, we next consider whether the
presumption is successfully rebutted. [FN4]

FX4. The State's brief does not address the
Pearce presumption of vindictiveness,
arguing instead that because the original
sentencing court did not know about
restitution agreed to in the plea negotiations,
the imposition of restitution at resentencing
was necessarily nonretaliatory.

13 [ 1[ 17 During resentencing the following colloquy
took place:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: [Mr. Samora] would like
the Court to be aware of some of the things that
he's been doing while he's been incarcerated. He
served two months in jail before he was sentenced
originally on this case and then he served an
additional approximately four months, I think,
sinceMR. SAMORA: Six. Six months.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Six months.
And it
would b e THE COURT: While you were pursuing the
appeal?
*608 DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Yeah. Well, I mean, the point is, I
guess, made.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: [I]t would be my request
on behalf of Mr. Samora that the Court do a couple
of things. One, that the Court would waive the
fine. There is some restitution owing that was part
of the negotiation in this case to the victim.... Mr.
Samora and the victim in the case had a fairly longterm relationship before this all happened and there
was, as part of the negotiation, he's to pay some
restitution with respect to that.
We'd ask the Court to-to waive or at least to
reduce the fine substantially and-and ask that the
Court give him credit for time served on this case.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you....
K
18 After receiving the victim's testimony
regarding the amount of restitution owed, the trial
judge imposed the maximum one-year sentence,
$2500 fine, a surcharge, and attorney fees. The court
also ordered Defendant to pay $744.80 in restitution,
without any reduction in the fine, as Defendant had
requested.
The trial judge initially denied
Defendant's request for credit for the six months he
had already served on his one-year sentence, but
relented after Defendant filed his Motion to
Reconsider Sentence.
**5 Ii 19 The State argues that although Defendant
"may have hoped for a reduction in his fine," the
record does not indicate that his agreement to pay
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restitution was conditioned on such a reduction
However, after reading the sentencing proceeding
transcript in context, it is apparent that Defendant
was asking the trial court to waive or substantially
reduce his fine so that Defendant could instead pay
restitution
It is unreasonable to believe that
Defendant volunteered to assume responsibility for
restitution, which if imposed would substantially
increase the monetary amount of Defendant's
sentence, on the mere hope that his fine would be
waived or reduced Furthermore, given extant case
law and section 76-3-405, Defendant was not
required to submit to a restitution order as part of
resentencing, nor was the trial court empowered to
order the same Given the record we have before us,
we cannot conclude that the presumption of
vindictiveness has been rebutted. Therefore, error
occurred because Defendant received a harsher
sentence after exercising his constitutional right to
appeal his original sentence.
[4] % 20 The State, however, also argues that
Defendant's harsher sentence was appropriate under
Utah Code Ann. 5 76-3-405(2 )(a). which allows for
an increased sentence when it is "based on facts
which were not known to the court at the time of the
onginal sentence." The State argues that because the
trial judge did not review the record, which included
Defendant's obligation to pay restitution, before
originally sentencing Defendant, the prohibition
against a harsher sentence does not apply.
We
disagree.

obvious to the trial court" Dunn, 350 P 2d at 1208
Section 76-3-405, federal case law, Bakah\_ and
Sort nsen clearly prohibit a harsher sentence on
resentencing absent specific circumstances The trial
court did not address nor specify any basis for
deviating from that mandate
*609 Therefore, the
error should have been recognized by the trial court
CONCLUSION
**6 % 23 We conclude that we have jurisdiction in
this case despite Defendant's failure to preserve the
issues before the trial court because the trial court
illegally imposed sentence in the first sentencing
Alternatively, there was plain error in imposing
sentence. Given the record before us, we conclude
that the presumption of vindictiveness or retaliation
has not been rebutted and Defendant received a
harsher sentence on resentencing m derogation of
section 76-3-405 and principles of due process
Therefore, we reverse and remand for sentencing in
accordance with this opinion. At resentencing, the
restitution order must be eliminated, or at Defendant's
option and with the dial court's agreement, die fine
may be reduced by the amount of restitution.

1 24 I CONCUR:
Presiding Judge.

NORMAN H JACKSON.

BENCH. Judge (dissenting):
f 21 The record discloses that restitution was
discussed at Defendant's plea hearing. In addition,
the record includes the "Statement of Defendant,
Certificate of Counsel and Order," signed by
Defendant, in which he agrees to pay restitution.
The State cannot claim that the facts regarding
restitution were unknown at the tune of the onginal
sentencing because the trial judge did not review the
record before sentencing Defendant. A trial judge,
like every other party to a proceeding, is charged
with knowledge of what is in the record. Therefore,
the trial judge's failure to familiarize himself with the
record in this case does not satisfy the lack of
knowledge requirement found in section 76-3-405.
Furthermore, as noted in the per curiam opinion
vacating Defendant's original sentence, the trial court
at the original sentencing did not provide an
opportunity for Defendant's counsel or the State to
provide any information relevant to sentencing. See
State v Samota, 2001 UT App 266 (per curiam).
Li] K 22 Having concluded that error occurred, we
now turn to whether "the error should have been

% 25 I see this case much differently dian do my
colleagues.
H 26 Judge Robin W. Reese took Defendant's plea.
In that proceeding, Defendant agreed to pay
restitution to the victim, his former girlfriend
Sentencing was then scheduled before Judge J
Dennis Frederick. When Defendant failed to appear
for sentencing, Judge Fredenck sentenced him in
absentia. No sentencing information was presented
at that proceeding, and Judge Fredenck imposed the
maximum jail time and fine. On the first appeal, this
court reversed Defendant's sentence in accordance
with State v Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241, 31 P 3d
615, cert granted, 42 P 3d 951 (Utah 2002). We
then remanded the case for resentencing.
% 27 At the resentencing hearing, Defendant
appeared and affirmatively asserted that, under his
plea agreement, he owed restitution. He said he
owed about $900, maybe "a little higher," although
the victim testified that $744 80 would cover her
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losses
Judge Frederick ordered Defendant to pay
the lesser sum in restitution, plus the maximum jail
time and fine Apparently, Defendant had hoped that
he would be ordered to pay just the restitution and no
fine
Defendant's attorney made the following
statement to the courtIt would be my request on behalf of Mr Samora
that the Court do a couple of things One, that the
Court would waive the fine There is some
restitution owing that was part of the negotiation m
this case to the victim. They've—Mr Samora and
the victim in the case had a fairly long-term
relationship before this all happened and there was,
as a part of the negotiation, [an agreement] to pay
some restitution with respect to that.
We'd ask the Court to-to waive or at least to
reduce the fine substantially and-and ask that the
Court give him credit for time served on this case.
K 28 Defendant never claimed below that the
imposition of restitution, in addition to the fine,
would violate due process or Utah Code Ann, fr 763-405(1999). Because Defendant did not raise this
issue below, we are precluded from addressing it
unless Defendant can demonstrate that exceptional
circumstances exist or plain error occurred.
See
State v Holmte. 2000 UT 74.1| 11. 10 P 3d 346. On
appeal, Defendant mentions plain error in reciting
what he believes to be the applicable standard of
review, but does not even purport to demonstrate how
the trial court plainly erred.
We, therefore, are
precluded from addressing the issue.
**7 f 29 We would be precluded from addressing
the issue even if Defendant had articulated a plain
error argument on appeal. "To establish plain error,
an appellant must demonstrate that '(0 an error exists,
(n) the error should have been obvious to the trial
court, and (in) the error is harmful/ " State v Pecht.
2002 UT 41,f 18. 48 P 3d 931 (quoting State v
Dunn. 850 P 2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)). Plam
error, however, can never be urged when the
appellant affirmatively invites the court's ruling. See
State v Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201. 1206 (Utah
Ct App 1991) (stating that "where invited error butts
up against manifest injustice [or plam error], the *610
invited error rule prevailsM). "The doctrine of invited
error 'prohibits a party from setting up an error at trial
and then complaining of it on appeal/ " Id at 1205
(citation omitted). Otherwise, a criminal defendant
could invite prejudicial error and "implant it in the
record as a form of appellate insurance. ." State v
Pafsons 781 P2d 1275. 1285 (Utah 1989) In this
case, Defendant affirmatively raised the issue of
restitution and agreed that restitution was owing He
did not claim that, if restitution were ordered, he had

a due process or statutory entitlement to a reduction
in the fine Given how he invited the court to
impose restitution, Defendant is now in no position to
challenge it on appeal
See Pet due 81 "* P 2d at
1205
U 30 Even if we could properly reach the merits of
Defendant's contention on appeal, the argument fails
because the first sentence had no legal effect
At
resentencing, the trial court was therefore not limited
by the terms of the first sentence
See Stare v
Babbel 813 P2d 86. 88 (Utah 1991) (stating that "
'[t]he rule followed by most jurisdictions is that an
unlawful sentence is of no legal effect, allowing the
court to correct the sentence by imposing lawful
terms at any time the illegality is discovered,
regardless of whether the correction involves an
increase' ") (quoting Annotation, Powei of Court to
Increase Seventy of Unlawful Sentence-Modern
Status. 28 A L R 4th 147. 152 (1984)).
K 31 The mam opinion is wrong in trying to
distinguish this case from Babbel
In Babbel. the
Utah Supreme Court cited the statute that preceded
rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
for the proposition that the trial court can " 'correct an
illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal
manner, at any time/ " Babbel. 813 P2d at 87
(citation omitted). The supreme court stated that
"[t]he correction of an illegal sentence stands on a
different footing from the correction of an error in a
conviction " Id at 88 Therefore, the court held that
"the principles underlying" the cases holding that
federal due process prohibits a harsher sentence from
being imposed m a second trial for the same offense
after a reversal of the first conviction, "have no
application [to t]he correction of an illegal sentence "

IL
**8 f 32 The initial sentence in the present case was
illegal because it was improperly imposed in
Defendant's absence. That was precisely how the
first appeal was argued. When we remanded the
case, we expressly noted that the court may correct
an illegal sentence at any time See State v Samora.
2001 UT App 266 at n 1 (per curiam) (unpublished
mem. decision) (referring to Utah R Cnm P 22(e))
My colleagues cannot now change course and hold
that a sentence imposed contrary to law is not an
illegal sentence. Rule 22(e) itself treats equally "an
illegal sentence" and "a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner " Utah R Cnm P 22(e) Because
this case involves an illegal sentence, there can be no
presumption of vindictiveness as described in \oith
Catohna v Pcaue. 395 US 711. 89 SCt 2072
(1969) See Babbel 813 P 2d at 87-88 When it
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resentenced Defendant, the trial court was therefore
not limited by the terms of the prior sentence. See
id., see also Texas v. McCullowzh. 475 U.S. 134. 106
S.Ct. 976, 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986) (quoting United
States v Goodwin. 457 U.S. 368, 374. 102 S.Ct.
2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982), for the proposition that
"[n]othing in the Constitution requires a judge to
ignore 'objective information ... justifying the
increased sentence'").
^ 33 Accordingly, I would affirm the sentencing
order.
59 P.3d 604, 2002 WL 31545759 (Utah App.), 460
Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 2002 UT 384
END OF DOCUMENT
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)

rage I

criminal defendant who is a fugitive may be
dismissed, subject to reinstatement if the defendant
returns to the jurisdiction and if the State cannot
demonstrate that it will be prejudiced by
reinstatement See eg State \ Tuttle 713 P 2d "'O \
~*Q^ (Ltah 1985) Because Wanosik is dispositive of
Samora's appeal and requires a remand for
resentencing, we decline to dismiss this appeal
[FN lj However, if Samora appeals the sentence
imposed after remand, the State may raise the
dismissal argument in the subsequent appeal

FN1 Even if we were to dismiss this appeal,
Samora could challenge the sentence in the
trial court under Rule 22(e) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure See Utah
R Cnm P 22(e) ("The court may correct
a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at
any time "), see also Wanosik, 241 UT App
241 at n 11 (stating issues regarding
illegality of the sentence under Rule 22(a)
can be considered for the first time on
appeal under Rule 22(e)) Judicial economy
suggests that we resolve the appeal from the
sentence and preserve the State's ability to
seek dismissal in any appeal taken after
resentencmg

We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing
in accordance with Wanosik

PER CURIAM
*1 Appellant Manuel Ernesto Samora appeals the
sentence on his conviction of Attempted Joyriding, a
class A misdemeanor

2001 WL 1021098 (Utah App ), 2001 UT App 266
END OF DOCUMENT

The issues raised m Samora's appeal are the same
issues determined in State v Wanosik, 2001 UT App
241 428 Utah Ad\ Rep 10, regarding sentencing in
absentia and a criminal defendant's Utah Rule ot
Criminal Piocedure 22(a) and Due Process nghts
Accordmgly, Samora is entitled to be resentenced
under Wanosik because the district court did not (1)
make an adequate inquiry into the actual
voluntariness of Samora's absence before proceeding
to sentence him in absentia, (2) provide Samora the
opportunity to present information through counsel in
mitigation of punishment and also provide the
prosecutor an opportunity to present information
relevant to sentencing, and (3) base the sentencing
decision on relevant and reliable information
regarding the cnme, defendant's background, and the
interests of society See id at^U 36-38
The State seeks dismissal of this appeal, relying
upon cases concluding that an appeal taken by a
Copr © West 2003 No Claim to Ong U S Govt Works
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—00O00—

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Robert C. Burr,
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No. 20000336-CA
FILED
October 19, 2000

2000 UTApp 288

Second District, Ogden Department
The Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan
Attorneys:
Robert C. Burr, Draper, Appellant Pro Se
L. Dean Saunders, Ogden, for Appellee

Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Orme.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Robert C. Burr appeals the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 22 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure. This case is before the court on the State's motion for summary affirmance.
The sentence imposed was within statutory limits; however, Burr contends the sentence was imposed in an illegal
manner because he was not personally provided with a copy of the presentence report. The sentencing transcript
reflects that the trial court confirmed that defense counsel had the opportunity to review the presentence report.
The trial judge also asked Burr whether he understood the sentencing recommendation made in the report, and
Burr responded in the affirmative.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404(b)(i) (1999) states that "the court, prosecutor, and the defendant ojihisattorney shall
be provided with" the written presentence report. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (6)(a)
(1999) states, in part, that "fthe department shall provide the presentence report to the defendant's attorney, or
the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for review three working days prior to
sentencing." (Emphasis added); see also Neel v. Holden. 886 P.2d 1097, 1102 n.4 (Utah 1996) (stating section
77-18-1 (6)(a) requires that "the defendant or the defendant's attorney be provided, prior to sentencing, with a

http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/mds/burr.htm
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written presentence report") Burr cites no authority for his claim that the court must affirmatively determine
whether a defendant who is represented by counsel has personally received or actually reviewed the report Burr
failed to establish that his sentence was either illegal or imposed in an illegal manner, and the trial court did not
err in denying the motion
The State also argues that Burr failed to timely move to withdraw his guilty plea under Utah Code Ann § 77-13-6
(1999) Burr did not file any motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court, and the issue is not properly before
this court on appeal The request to withdraw the guilty plea was based solely upon the Rule 22(e) motion See
State v Arviso, 1999 UT App 381 /H1J9-11, 993 P 2d 894 (holding guilty plea may be withdrawn in the limited
circumstance where plea bargain contemplated a particular sentence subsequently determined to be illegal)
Having determined that the sentence was not illegal or imposed in an illegal manner, there is no basis from which
to conclude that Burr should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea
Affirmed.

Norman H Jackson,
Associate Presiding Judge

Judith M. Billings, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

http://www.utcourts.gov/opinlons/mds^urrhtm
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Thomas C. Headley,
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No. 990462-CA
FILED
February 28, 2002
ll 2002 UT App 58 \\

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Tyrone Medley
Attorneys:
Edward R. Montgomery, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Thomas Brunker, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Jackson, Greenwood, and Thorne.
JACKSON, Presiding Judge:
Thomas Headley appeals the district court's denial of his Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence submitted under Rule
22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. He contends the district court erred in ruling that his motion did
"not attack the legality of the sentence imposed nor the manner in which the sentence was imposed." Headley's
contention is two-fold: (1) his counsel at sentencing provided ineffective assistance; and (2) the sentencing court
relied on information in the presentence report that the court knew was false. We affirm.
A district court's Rule 22(e) decision is a legal question that we review for correctness, see State v._Brooks, 908
P.2d 856, 858-59 (Utah 1995); State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 381, 384-85 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), and we can affirm
the decision "if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record." State v. Finlayson. 2000
UT 10J31, 994 P.2d 1243. Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for resentencing when a
sentence is illegal or "imposed in an illegal manner." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). The definition of an "illegal sentence"
has been construed narrowly to include only sentences "where the sentence does not conform to the crime of
which the defendant has been convicted."*1 ) State v. Parker. 872 P.2d 1041,1043 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Utah
law has no comprehensive definition of sentences "imposed in an illegal manner"; however, the Utah Supreme
Court has ruled that a sentence is imposed in an illegal manner when a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth
Amendment right to counsel during sentencing.*2* See Kuehnertv, Turner, 28 Utah 2d 150, 499 P.2d 839, 841
(1975) (concluding that the sentence was illegal because the defendant did not have counsel at sentencing, was

not informed of his Sixth Amendment rights during sentencing, and had not knowingly and intelligently waived his
Sixth Amendment rights)
In Kuehnert, the Utah Supreme Court stated that the presence of counsel at
sentencing is necessary
so that there is a real opportunity to present to the court facts in extenuation of the offense or in
explanation of the defendant's conduct, as well as to correct any errors or mistakes in reports of the
defendant's past record and to appeal to the equity of the court in its administration and enforcement
of penal laws
Id at 840-41
Headley first claims his counsel at sentencing provided ineffective assistance, thus depriving him of his Sixth
Amendment right To support his claim, Headley makes six assertions, four are as follows (1) he asserts that his
challenge to misinformation in the presentence investigation report was rejected by the sentencing court because
it was poorly handled by sentencing counsel, (2) he challenges several factual statements contained in the
presentence investigation report; (3) he asserts that "his own counsel accused him of being involved in incest
when that information was not otherwise before the court", and (4) he asserts that "his [sentencing] counsel
convinced a witness with potentially exculpatory evidence not to cooperate with [Headley]" Each of these four
assertions has some connection with the presentence investigation report, which is not in the record on appeal
Further, no other information in the record supports these assertions Accordingly, as discussed below, we are
unable to address them
Next, Headley claims the sentencing court imposed a $10,000 fine without reason and without objection by his
counsel We find no mention of a $10,000 fine in the record The only fines mentioned in the sentencing context, a
$1,000 recoupment fee and an unspecified amount to "pay for costs of extradition and for therapy of victim," are
found in the sentencing transcript and the Judgment filed three days later Finally, Headley alleges that "his
counsel intentionally tried to prevent him from pursuing an appeal" However, the record reflects that Headley filed
a notice of appeal on September 24,1992, but voluntarily moved to dismiss his appeal to "file a motion to
withdraw his plea of guilty" Headley's motion was granted on October 8,1992, and the record contains no
indication of subsequent attempts to appeal the case
Without the presentence report or other information which may or may not be in the sentencing court record, the
record submitted to us is inadequate for our review of Headley's ineffective assistance claim All we have are
Headley's unilateral, bald assertions of misconduct As we have stated,
When a defendant predicates error to [an appellate court], he has the duty and responsibility of
supporting such allegation by an adequate record Absent that record, a defendant's assignment of
error stands as a unilateral allegation which the reviewing court has no power to determine [An
appellate court] simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts
unsupported by the record Consequently, in the face of an [inadequate record on appeal, [we]
must assume the regularity of the proceedings below
State v Penman, 964 P 2d 1157,1162 (1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in original),
see also State v Litherland. 2000 UT 76J17,12 P 3d 92 ("Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion,
ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel
performed effectively"). Accordingly, we reject Headley's Sixth Amendment claim
Next, Headley claims the sentencing court was biased because it relied on information in the presentence report
that the court knew was false Utah Code Ann § 77-18-1(6) (Supp 2001) gives a sentencing judge discretion in
evaluating information in a presentence report and requires the judge to "make a determination of relevance and
accuracy on the record" Here, the sentencing judge made a determination of the relevance and accuracy of the
presentence report, deciding the presentence report was "comprehensive in all the details," and stating that those
working on elements of the presentence report "do a pretty good job " The sentencing court has broad discretion
to resolve factual disputes for or against a defendant, see id , and we cannot say the court exceeded its discretion
in making this determination Further, without the presentence report, the record is inadequate and "'[we] must
assume the regularity of the proceedings below '" Penman. 964 P 2d at 1162 (citation omitted) (alteration in
original)
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Headtey's Rule 22(e) motion for resentencing.

Norman H. Jackson,
Presiding Judge

I CONCUR:

William A. Thome Jr., Judge

GREENWOOD, Judge (concurring in the result):
I concur in the result reached by my colleagues, but would affirm on what I perceive to be a more straightforward
basis. As stated by the majority, the trial court denied defendant's Rule 22(e) motion because the motion did "not
attack the legality of the sentence imposed nor the manner in which the sentence was imposed." The trial court
was correct.
Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and erroneous fact findings by the sentencing judge are
simply not cognizable under Rule 22(e). Defendant has not cited any caselaw holding otherwise and has also not
offered any reasoned analysis for why Rule 22(e) should apply to his case. See State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299,
305 (Utah 1998) (briefs must include "reasoned analysis based on [cited] authority"). The sentence imposed was
permissible under applicable statutes, and the trial court properly resolved factual disputes presented to it.
Defendant raises no claims legitimately related to whether the sentence was illegal or "imposed in an illegal
manner." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). On that basis, I would affirm.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
1. Nonconforming sentences include those where the sentence exceeds the statutory limits. See, e.g.. State v.
Higginbotham. 917 P.2d 545, 551 (Utah 1996) (concluding that the sentence was illegal because statute only
authorized one year enhancement and the court enhanced sentence by two years); State v. Patience. 944 P.2d
381, 388 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the sentence was illegal because it exceeded statutory term).
Nonconforming sentences also occur when the court is without jurisdiction to impose a sentence. See, e.g.. Sjate
v. Hurst, 777 P.2d 1029,1036 n.6 (Utah 1989) (stating that sentences can be attacked when beyond the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court); State v. Arviso. 1999 UT App 381,HH5-8, 993 P.2d 894 (stating that the
sentence was illegal because Supremacy Clause deprived sentencing court of jurisdiction); State v. Grate. 947
P.2d 1161,1168 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating that the sentence was illegal because court did not have
jurisdiction to revoke probation).
2. Other jurisdictions have defined sentences imposed in an illegal manner as those that are within statutory and
jurisdictional limits, but violate a defendant's rights, se_et e.g., Government of the V.I, v. Martinez, 239 F.3d 293,
299 n.3 (3rd Cir. 2001); State v. McNellis. 546 A.2d 292, 305-06 (Conn. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Sieler, 554
N.W.2d 447,479 (S.D. 1996); c t State v. Anderson. 661 P.2d 716, 720-24 (Haw. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Brooks.
589 A.2d 444, 447 (Maine 1991); or that are based on erroneous information. See, e.g.. United States v. Katzin.

824 F 2d 234, 238 (3rd Cir 1987)
3 Kuehnert, which discusses illegal sentences under the rules in force prior to Rule 22(e), was not cited in the
parties' briefs
4 See also McConneliv Rhay, 393 US 2, 4, 89 S Ct 32, 33-34 (1968) ("As we said in Mempa[ v Rhay, 389
US 128, 135, 88 S Ct 254, 257 (1967)], 'the necessity for the aid of counsel in marshaling the facts, introducing
evidence of mitigating circumstances[,] and in general aiding and assisting the defendant to present his case as to
sentence is apparent' The right to counsel at sentencing must, therefore, be treated like the right to counsel at
other stages of adjudication " (Citation omitted ))
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